It is known that if a 2-universal hash function H is applied to elements of a block source (X 1 , . . . , X T ), where each item X i has enough min-entropy conditioned on the previous items, then the output distribution (H, H(X 1 ), . . . , H(X T )) will be "close" to the uniform distribution. We provide improved bounds on how much min-entropy per item is required for this to hold, both when we ask that the output be close to uniform in statistical distance and when we only ask that it be statistically close to a distribution with small collision probability. In both cases, we reduce the dependence of the min-entropy on the number T of items from 2 log T in previous work to log T , which we show to be optimal. This leads to corresponding improvements to the recent results of Mitzenmacher and Vadhan (SODA '08) on the analysis of hashing-based algorithms and data structures when the data items come from a block source.
Introduction
A block source is a sequence of items X = (X 1 , . . . , X T ) in which each item has at least some k bits of "entropy" conditioned on the previous ones [CG88] . Previous works [CG88, Zuc96, MV08] have analyzed what happens when one applies a 2-universal hash function to each item in such a sequence, establishing results of the following form:
Block-Source Hashing Theorems (informal): If (X 1 , . . . , X T ) is a block source with k bits of "entropy" per item and H is a random hash function from a 2-universal family mapping to m ≪ k bits, then (H(X 1 ), . . . , H(X T )) is "close" to the uniform distribution.
In this paper, we prove new results of this form, achieving improved (in some cases, optimal) bounds on how much entropy k per item is needed to ensure that the output is close to uniform, as a function of the other parameters (the output length m of the hash functions, the number T of items, and the "distance" from the uniform distribution). But first we discuss the two applications that have motivated the study of Block-Source Hashing Theorems.
Applications of Block-Source Hashing
Randomness Extractors. A randomness extractor is an algorithm that extracts almostuniform bits from a source of biased and correlated bits, using a short seed of truly random bits as a catalyst [NZ96] . Extractors have many applications in theoretical computer science and have played a central role in the theory of pseudorandomness. (See the surveys [NT99, Sha04, Vad07] .) Block-source Hashing Theorems immediately yield methods for extracting randomness from block sources, where the seed is used to specify a universal hash function. The gain over hashing the entire T -tuple at once is that the blocks may be much shorter than the entire sequence, and thus a much shorter seed is required to specify the universal hash function. Moreover, many subsequent constructions of extractors for general sources (without the block structure) work by first converting the source into a block source and performing block-source hashing.
Analysis of Hashing-Based Algorithms. The idea of hashing has been widely applied in designing algorithms and data structures, including hash tables [Knu98] , Bloom filters [BM03] , summary algorithms for data streams [Mut03] , etc. Given a stream of data items (x 1 , . . . , x T ), we first hash the items into (H(x 1 ), . . . , H(x T )), and carry out a computation using the hashed values. In the literature, the analysis of a hashing algorithm is typically a worst-case analysis on the input data items, and the best results are often obtained by unrealistically modelling the hash function as a truly random function mapping the items to uniform and independent m-bit strings. On the other hand, for realistic, efficiently computable hash functions (eg., 2-universal or O(1)-wise independent hash functions), the provable performance is sometimes significantly worse. However, such gaps seem to not show up in practice, and even standard 2-universal hash functions empirically seem to match the performance of truly random hash functions. To explain this phenomenon, Mitzenmacher and Vadhan [MV08] have suggested that the discrepancy is due to worst-case analysis, and propose to instead model the input items as coming from a block source. Then Block-Source Hashing Theorems imply that the performance of universal hash functions is close to that of truly random hash functions, provided that each item has enough bits of entropy.
How Much Entropy is Required?
A natural question about Block-Source Hashing Theorems is: how large does the "entropy" k per item need to be to ensure a certain amount of "closeness" to uniform (where both the entropy and closeness can be measured in various ways). This also has practical significance for the latter motivation regarding hashing-based algorithms, as it corresponds to the amount of entropy we need to assume in data items. In [MV08] , they provide bounds on the entropy required for two measures of closeness, and use these as basic tools to bound the required entropy in various applications. The requirement is usually some small constant multiple of log T , where T is the number of items in the source, which can be on the borderline between a reasonable and unreasonable assumption about real-life data. Therefore, it is interesting to pin down the optimal answers to these questions. In what follows, we first summarize the previous results, and then discuss our improved analysis and corresponding lower bounds.
A standard way to measure the distance of the output from the uniform distribution is by statistical distance. 1 In the randomness extractor literature, classic results [CG88, ILL89, Zuc96] show that using 2-universal hash functions, k = m + 2 log(T /ε) + O(1) bits of minentropy (or even Renyi entropy) 2 per item is sufficient for the output distribution to be ε-close to uniform in statistical distance. Sometimes a less stringent closeness requirement is sufficient, where we only require that the output distribution is ε-close to a distribution having "small" collision probability 3 . A result of [MV08] shows that k = m + 2 log T + log(1/ε) + O(1) suffices to achieve this requirement. Using 4-wise independent hash functions, [MV08] further reduce the required entropy to k = max{m + log T, 1/2(m + 3 log T + log(1/ε))} + O(1).
Our Results. We reduce the entropy required in the previous results, as summarized in Table 1 . Roughly speaking, we save an additive log T bits of min-entropy (or Renyi entropy) for all cases. We show that using universal hash functions, k = m + log T + 2 log 1/ε+ O(1) bits per item is sufficient for the output to be ε-close to uniform, and k = m + log(T /ε)+ O(1) is enough for the output to be ε-close to having small collision probability. Using 4-wise independent hash functions, the entropy k further reduces to max{m + log T, 1/2(m + 2 log T + log 1/ε)} + O(1). The results hold even if we consider the joint distribution (H, H(X 1 ), . . . , H(X T )) (corresponding to "strong extractors" in the literature on randomness extractors). Substituting our improved bounds in the analysis of hashing-based algorithms from [MV08] , we obtain similar reductions in the min-entropy required for every application with 2-universal hashing. With 4-wise independent hashing, we obtain a slight improvement for Linear Probing, and for the 1 The statistical distance of two random variables X and Y is ∆(X,
where T ranges over all possible events. 2 The min-entropy of a random variable X is H∞(X) = minx log(1/ Pr[X = x]). All of the results mentioned actually hold for the less stringent measure of Renyi entropy H2(X) = log(1/ Ex←X[Pr[X = x]]).
3 The collision probability of a random variable X is P x Pr[X = x] 2 . By "small collision probability," we mean that the collision probability is within a constant factor of the collision probability of uniform distribution.
Setting Previous Results
Our Results 2-universal hashing m + 2 log T + 2 log(1/ε) m + log T + 2 log(1/ε) ε-close to uniform [CG88, ILL89, Zuc96] 2-universal hashing m + 2 log T + log(1/ε) [MV08] m + log T + log(1/ε) ε-close to small cp. 4-wise indep. hashing max{m + log T, max{m + log T, ε-close to small cp.
1/2(m + 3 log T + log 1/ε)} [MV08] 1/2(m + 2 log T + log(1/ε)} Table 1 : Our Results: Each entry denotes the min-entropy (actually, Renyi entropy) required per item when hashing a block source of T items to m-bit strings to ensure that the output has statistical distance at most ε from uniform (or from having collision probability within a constant factor of uniform). Additive constants are omitted for readability.
other applications, we show that the previous bounds can already be achieved with 2-universal hashing. The results are summarized in Table 2 .
Although the log T improvement seems small, we remark that it could be significant for practical settings of parameter. For example, suppose we want to hash 64 thousand internet traffic flows, so log T ≈ 16. Each flow is specified by the 32-bit IP addresses and 16-bit port numbers for the source and destination plus the 8-bit transport protocol, for a total of 104 bits. There is a noticeable difference between assuming that each flow contains 3 log T ≈ 48 vs. 4 log T ≈ 64 bits of entropy as they are only 104 bits long, and are very structured.
We also prove corresponding lower bounds showing that our upper bounds are almost tight. Specifically, we show that when the data items have not enough entropy, then the joint distribution (H, H(X 1 ), . . . , H(X T )) can be "far" from uniform. More precisely, we show that if k = m + log T + 2 log 1/ε − O(1), then there exists a block source (X 1 , . . . , X T ) with k bits of min-entropy per item such that the distribution (H, H(X 1 ), . . . , H(X T )) is ε-far from uniform in statistical distance (for H coming from any hash family). This matches our upper bound up to an additive constant. Similarly, we show that if k = m + log T − O(1), then there exists a block source (X 1 , . . . , X T ) with k bits of min-entropy per item such that the distribution (H, H(X 1 ), . . . , H(X T )) is 0.99-far from having small collision probability (for H coming from any hash family). This matches our upper bound up to an additive constant in case the statistical distance parameter ε is constant; we also exhibit a specific 2-universal family for which the log(1/ε) in our upper bound is nearly tight -it cannot be reduced below log(1/ε) − log log(1/ε). Finally, we also extend all of our lower bounds to the case that we only consider distribution of hashed values (H(X 1 ), . . . , H(X T )), rather than their joint distribution with Y . For this case, the lower bounds are necessarily reduced by a term that depends on the size of the hash family. (For standard constructions of universal hash functions, this amounts to log n bits of entropy, where n is the bit-length of an individual item.)
Type of Hash Family Previous Results [MV08] Our Results
Linear Probing 2-universal hashing 4 log T 3 log T 4-wise independence 2.5 log T 2 log T Balanced Allocations with d Choices 2-universal hashing (d + 2) log T (d + 1) log T 4-wise independence (d + 1) log T -Bloom Filters 2-universal hashing 4 log T 3 log T 4-wise independence 3 log T - Table 2 : Applications: Each entry denotes the min-entropy (actually, Renyi entropy) required per item to ensure that the performance of the given application is "close" to the performance when using truly random hash functions. In all cases, the bounds omit additive terms that depend on how close a performance is desired, and we restrict to the (standard) case that the size of the hash table is linear in the number of items being hashed. That is, m = log T + O(1).
Techniques.
At a high level, all of the previous analyses for hashing block sources were loose due to summing error probabilities over the T blocks. Our improvements come from avoiding this linear blow-up by choosing more refined measures of error. For example, when we want the output to have small statistical distance from uniform, the classic Leftover Hash Lemma [ILL89] says that min-entropy k = m + 2 log(1/ε 0 ) suffices for a single hashed block to be ε 0 -close to uniform, and then a "hybrid argument" implies that the joint distribution of T hashed blocks is T ε 0 -close to uniform [Zuc96] . Setting ε 0 = ε/T , this leads to a min-entropy requirement of k = m + 2 log(1/ε) + 2 log T per block. We obtain a better bound, reducing 2 log T to log T , by using Hellinger distance to analyze the error accumulation over blocks, and only passing to statistical distance at the end.
For the case where we only want the output to be close to having small collision probability, the previous analysis of [MV08] worked by first showing that the expected collision probability of each hashed block h(X i ) is "small" even conditioned on previous blocks, then using Markov's Inequality to deduce that each hashed block has small collision probability except with some probability ε 0 , and finally doing a union bound to deduce that all hashed blocks have small collision probability except with probability T ε 0 . We avoid the union bound by working with more refined notions of "conditional collision probability," which enable us to apply Markov's Inequality on the entire sequence rather than on each block individually.
The starting point for our negative results is the tight lower bound for randomness extractors due to Radhakrishnan and Ta-Shma [RT00] . Their methods show that if the min-entropy parameter k is not large enough, then for any hash family, there exists a (single-block) source X such that h(X) is "far" from uniform (in statistical distance) for "many" hash functions h. We then take our block source (X 1 , . . . , X T ) to consist of T iid copies of X, and argue that the statistical distance from uniform grows sufficiently fast with the number T of copies taken. For example, we show that if two distributions have statistical distance ε, then their T -fold products have statistical distance Ω(min{1, √ T · ε}), strengthening a previous bound of Reyzin [Rey04] , who proved a bound of Ω(min{ε 1/3 , √ T · ε}).
Preliminaries
Notations. All logs are based 2. We use the convention that N = 2 n , K = 2 k , and M = 2 m . We think of a data item X as a random Block Sources and Collision Probability. For a random variable X, the collision probability of X is cp(X) = Pr[X = X ′ ] = x Pr[X = x] 2 , where X ′ is an independent copy of X. The Renyi entropy H 2 (X) = log(1/cp(X)) can be viewed as a measure of the amount of randomness in X (In the randomness extractor literature, the entropy is measured by min-entropy H ∞ (X) = min x∈supp(X) log(1/ Pr[X = x]), but using the less stringent measure Renyi entropy makes our results stronger since H 2 (X) ≥ H ∞ (X).) For an event E, (X| E ) is the random variable defined by conditioning X on E.
, and every x <i in the support of X <i , we have cp(
That is, each item X i has at least k = log K bits of Renyi entropy even after conditioning on the previous items.
Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X T ) be a sequence of random variables over [M ] T . We are interested in bounding the overall collision probability cp(X) by the collision probability of each blocks.
Suppose all X i 's are independent, then cp(X) = T i=1 cp(X i ). The following lemma generalizes Lemma 4.2 in [MV08] , which says that if for every x ∈ X, the average collision probability of every block X i conditioning on X <i = x <i is small, then the overall collision probability cp(X) is also small. In particular, if X is a block K-source, then cp(X) ≤ 1/K T . Lemma 2.2 Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X T ) be a sequence of random variables such that for every x ∈ supp(X),
Then the overall collision probability satisfies cp(X) ≤ α T .
Proof. By Arithmetic Mean-Geometric Mean Inequality, the inequality in the premise implies
Therefore, it suffices to prove
We prove it by induction on T . The base case T = 1 is trivial. Suppose the lemma is true for T − 1. We have
as desired.
Statistical Distance. The statistical distance is a standard way to measure the distance of two distributions. Let X and Y be two random variables. The statistical distance of X and
The following standard lemma says that if X has small collision probability, then X is close to uniform in statistical distance.
Conditional Collision Probability. Let (X, Y ) be jointly distributed random variables. We can define the conditional Renyi entropy of X conditioning on Y as follows.
Definition 2.4
The conditional collision probability of X conditioning on
The following lemma says that as in the case of Shannon entropy, conditioning can only decrease the entropy.
Proof. For the first inequality, we have
For the second inequality, observe that for every y in the support of Y , we have cp(
3 Positive Results: How Much Entropy is Sufficient?
In this section, we present our positive results, showing that the distribution of hashed sequence
) is close to uniform when H is a random hash function from a 2-universal hash family, and X = (X 1 , . . . , X T ) has sufficient entropy per block. The new contribution is that we will not need K = 2 k to be as large as in previous works, and so save the required randomness in the block source X = (X 1 , . . . , X T ).
Small Collision Probability Using 2-universal Hash Functions
be a random hash function from a 2-universal family H. We first study the conditions under which (H, Y) = (H, H(X 1 ), . . . , H(X T )) is ε-close to having collision probability O(1/(|H| · M T )). This requirement is less stringent than (H, Y) being ε-close to uniform in statistical distance, and so requires less bits of entropy. Mitzenmacher and Vadhan [MV08] show that this guarantee suffices for some hashing applications. They show that K ≥ M T 2 /ε is enough to satisfy the requirement. We save a factor of T , and show that in fact, K ≥ M T /ε, is sufficient. (Taking logs yields the first entry in Table 1 , i.e. it suffices to have Renyi entropy k = m + log T + log(1/ε) per block.) Formally, we prove the following theorem.
To analyze the distribution of the hashed sequence (H, Y), the starting point is the following version of the Leftover Hash Lemma [BBR85, ILL89] , which says that when we hash a random variable X with enough entropy using a 2-universal hash function H, the conditional collision probability of H(X) conditioning on H is small. [MV08] , and how we improve the analysis. The following natural approach is taken in [MV08] . Since the data X is a block K-source, the Leftover Hash Lemma tells us that for every block i ∈ [T ], if we condition on the previous blocks X <i = x <i , then the hashed value
This is equivalent to saying that the average collision probability of (Y i | X <i =x <i ) over the choice of the hash function H is small, i.e.,
We can then use a Markov argument to say that for every block, with probability at least 1 − ε/T over h ← H, the collision probability is at most 1/M + T /(Kε). We can then take a union bound to say that for every x ∈ supp(X), at least (1 − ε)-fraction of hash functions h are good in the sense that cp(h(X i )| X <i =x <i ) is small for all blocks i = 1, . . . , T . [MV08] shows that if this condition is true for every (h, x) ∈ supp(H, X), then Y is a block (1/M + T /(Kε))-source, and thus the overall collision probability is at most (1 + M T /Kε) T /M T .
[MV08] also shows how to modify an ε-fraction of the distribution to fix the bad hash functions, and thus complete the analysis. The problem of the above analysis is that taking a Markov argument for each block, and then taking a union bound incurs a loss of factor T . To avoid this, we want to apply Markov argument only once to the whole sequence. For example, a natural thing to try is to sum over blocks to get
and use a Markov argument to deduce that for every x ∈ supp(X), with probability 1 − ε over h ← H, the average collision probability per block satisfies
We need to bound the collision probability of Y using this information. We may want to apply Lemma 2.2, but it requires the information on (1/T )
That is, Lemma 2.2 requires us to condition on previous hashed values Y <i , whereas the above argument refers to conditioning on the un-hashed values X <i . The difficulty with directly reasoning about the former is that conditioned on the hashed values Y <i , the hash function H may no longer be uniform (as it is correlated with Y <i ) and thus the Leftover Hash Lemma no longer applies.
To get around with the issues, we work with the averaged form of conditional collision probability cp(Y i |H, Y <i ), as from Definition 2.4. Our key observation is that now we can apply Lemma 2.5 to deduce that for every block i ∈ [T ], the conditional collision probability satisfies cp(
Then, by a Markov argument, it follows that with probability 1 − ε over (h, y) ← (H, Y), the average collision probability satisfies
We can then modify an ε-fraction of distribution, and apply Lemma 2.2 to complete the analysis.
The following lemma formalizes our claim about that the conditional collision probability of every block of (H, Y) is small.
. By the definition of block K-source, for every x <i in the support of X <i , cp(
, and then further conditioning on X <i . By Lemma 2.5, we have
We use this to prove Theorem 3.1 as outlined above.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: By Lemma 3.3, for every i ∈ [T ], we have
By linearity of expectation, the average conditional collision probability is also small.
Note that the collision probability of a random variable over [M ] is at least 1/M . Thus, Markov's inequality implies that with probability at least 1 − ε over (h, y) ← (H, Y),
In Lemma 3.4 below, we show how to fix the bad (h, y)'s by modifying at most ε-fraction of the distribution. Formally, Lemma 3.4 says that there exists a distribution (H,
, and for every (h, z) ← (H, Z),
Applying Lemma 2.2 on (Z| H=h ) for every h ∈ supp(H), we have
T such that with probability at least 1 − ε over (h, y) ← (H, Y), the average conditional collision probability satisfies
Then there exists a distribution
, and for every (h, z) ∈ supp(H, Z), we have
Furthermore, the marginal distribution of H is unchanged.
Proof. We define the distribution (H, Z) as follows.
• Sample (h, y) ← (H, Y).
•
• Otherwise, let j ∈ [T ] be the least index such that
, and output (h, y 1 , . . . , y j , w j+1 , . . . , w T ).
It is easy to check that
) ≤ 1/M +α, and (iv) the marginal distribution of H is unchanged.
Small Collision Probability Using 4-wise Independent Hash Functions
As discussed in [MV08] , using 4-wise independent hash functions H : [N ] → [M ] from H, we can further reduce the required randomness in the data X = (X 1 , . . . , X T ). [MV08] shows that in this case, K ≥ M T + 2M T 3 /ε is enough for the hashed sequence (H, Y) to be ε-close to having collision probability O(1/|H| · M T ). As discussed in the previous subsection, by avoiding using union bounds, we show that K ≥ M T + 2M T 2 /ε suffices. (Taking logs yields the second entry in Table 1 , i.e. it suffices to have Renyi entropy k = max{m + log T, (1/2) · (m + 2 log T + log(1/ε))} + O(1) per block.) Formally, we prove the following theorem. 
The improvement of Theorem 3.5 over Theorem 3.1 comes from that when we use 4-wise independent hash families, we have a concentration result on the conditional collision probability for each block , via the following lemma. 
We can then replace the application of Markov's Inequality in the proof of Theorem 3.1 by Chebychev's Inequality to get stronger result. Formally, we prove the following lemma, which suffices to prove Theorem 3.5. 
Then with probability at least 1 − ε over (h, y) ← (H, Y),
Theorem 3.5 follows immediately by composing Lemma 3.7, 3.4, and 2.2 in the same way as the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Lemma 3.7: Recall that we have
Hence, our goal is to upper bound the probability of the value (1/T )
) deviating from its mean by 2/M K 2 ε. Our strategy is to bound the variance of a properly defined random variable, and then apply Chebychev's Inequality. By Lemma 3.6, the information we get from 4-wise independent hash function is that for every i ∈ [T ], we have
Fix i ∈ [T ], let us try to bound the variance of the i-th block. There are two issues to take care of. Firstly, the variance we have is conditioning on X <i instead of Y <i . Secondly, even when conditioning on X <i , it is possible that the variance is
The reason is that conditioning on different X <i = x <i , the collision probability of (Y i | X <i =x <i ) may have different expectation over h ← H. Thus, we have to subtract the mean first. Let us define
Now, for every x <i ∈ supp(X <i ), f (H, x <i ) has mean 0, and variance ≤ 2/M K 2 . It follows that Var
We now deal with the issue of conditioning on X <i versus Y <i . Let us define
Indeed, by Lemma 2.5 and the definition of f and g,
has mean 0 and small variance:
The above argument holds for every block i ∈ [T ]. Taking average over blocks, we get
Finally, we can apply Chebychev's Inequality to random variable (1/T ) · i g(H, Y <i ) to get the desired result: with probability 1 − ε over (h, y) ← (H, Y), We save a factor of T , and show that in fact, K = M T /ε 2 is sufficient. (Taking logs yields the third entry in Table 1 , i.e. it suffices to have Renyi entropy k = m + log T + 2 log(1/ε) per block.) Formally, we prove the following theorem.
Statistical Distance to Uniform Distribution
Recall that the previous analysis goes by passing to statistical distance first, and then measuring the growth of distance using statistical distance. This incurs a quadratic dependency of K on T . Since without further information, the hybrid argument is tight, to save a factor of T , we have to measure the increase of distance over blocks in another way, and pass to statistical distance only in the end. It turns out that the Hellinger distance (cf., [GS02] ) is a good measure for our purposes: Definition 3.9 (Hellinger distance) Let X and Y be two random variables over [M ] . The Hellinger distance between X and Y is
Like statistical distance, Hellinger distance is a distance measure for distributions, and it takes value in [0, 1]. The following standard lemma says that the two distance measures are closely related. We remark that the lemma is tight in both directions even if Y is the uniform distribution.
Lemma 3.10 (cf., [GS02] ) Let X and Y be two random variables over [M ] . We have
In particular, the lemma allows us to upper-bound the statistical distance by upper-bounding the Hellinger distance. Since our goal is to bound the distance to uniform, it is convenient to introduce the following definition. 
Note that C(X, Y ) = C(X) · C(Y ) when X and Y are independent random variables, so the Hellinger closeness is well-behaved with respect to products (unlike statistical distance). By Lemma 3.10, if the Hellinger closeness C(X) is close to 1, then X is close to uniform in statistical distance. Recall that collision probability behaves similarly. If the collision probability cp(X) is close to 1/M , then X is close to uniform. In fact, by the following normalization, we can view the collision probability as the 2-norm of X, and the Hellinger closeness as the 1/2-norm of X.
Let
In terms of f (·), the collision probability is cp( says that if the "1/2-norm"
We now discuss our approach to prove Theorem 3.8. We want to show that (H, Y) is close to uniform. All we know is that the conditional collision probability cp(Y i |H, Y <i ) is close to 1/M for every block. If all blocks are independent, then the overall collision probability cp(H, Y) is small, and so (H, Y) is close to uniform. However, this is not true without independence, since 2-norm tends to over-weight heavy elements. In contrast, the 1/2-norm does not suffer this problem. Therefore, our approach is to show that small conditional collision probability implies large Hellinger closeness. Formally, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.12 Let X = (X 1 , . . 
. , X T ) be jointly distributed random variables over
[M 1 ] × · · · × [M T ] such that cp(X i |X <i ) ≤ α i /M i for every i ∈ [T ]
. Then the Hellinger closeness satisfies
With this lemma, the proof of Theorem 3.8 is immediate.
Proof of Theorem 3.8: By Lemma 3.3, cp(H) = 1/|H|, and cp(Y
. By Lemma 3.12, the Hellinger closeness satisfies
. It follows by Lemma 3.10 that
We proceed to prove Lemma 3.12. The main idea is to use Hölder's inequality to relate two different norms. We recall Hölder's inequality first.
Lemma 3.13 (Hölder's inequality[Dur04])
• Let F, G be two non-negative functions from [M ] to R, and p, q > 0 satisfying 1/p + 1/q = 1. Let x be a uniformly random index over [M ] . We have
• In general, let F 1 , . . . , F n be non-negative functions from [M ] to R, and p 1 , . . .
Proof of Lemma 3.12: We prove it by induction on T . The base case T = 1 is already non-trivial. Let X be a random variable over [M ] with cp(X) ≤ α/M , we need to show that the Hellinger closeness C(X) ≥ 1/α. Recall the normalization we mentioned before. Let
We now apply Hölder's inequality with F = f 2/3 , G = f 1/3 , p = 3, and q = 3/2. We have
Suppose the lemma is true for T − 1, we show that it is true for
To apply the induction hypothesis, we consider the conditional random variables (X 2 , . . . , X T | X 1 =x ) for every x ∈ [M 1 ]. For every x ∈ [M 1 ] and j = 2, . . . , T , we define g j (x) = M j · cp((X j | X 1 =x )|(X 2 , . . . , X j−1 | X 1 =x )) to be the "normalized" conditional collision probability. By induction hypothesis, we have C(X 2 , . . . ,
We use Hölder's inequality twice to show that Ex[
Let us first summarize the constraints we have. By definition, we have Ex[f (x) 2 ] ≤ α 1 . Fix
It follows that Ex[f (x)g j (x)] ≤ α j for j = 2, . . . , T . Now, we apply the second version of Hölder's Inequality with
, and p j = 1/(T + 1) for j = 2, . . . , T , which gives
It remains to lower bound the first term by 1/α 1 . We apply Hölder again with F = f 2/(T +2) , G = f T /(T +2) , p = T + 2, and q = (T + 2)/(T + 1), which gives
Combining the inequalities, we have C(X) ≥ 1/α 1 · · · α T .
Negative Results: How Much Entropy is Necessary?
In this section, we provide lower bounds on the entropy needed for the data items. We show that if K is not large enough, then for every hash family H, there exists a block K-source X = (X 1 , . . . , X T ) such that the hashed sequence Y = (H(X 1 ), . . . , H(X T )) do not satisfy the desired closeness requirements to uniform (possibly in conjunction with the hash function H).
Lower Bound for Statistical Distance to Uniform Distribution
Let us first consider the requirement for the joint distribution of (H, Y) being ε-close to uniform. When there is only one block, this is exactly the requirement for a "strong extractor". The lower bound in the extractor literature, due to Radhakrishnan and Ta-Shma [RT00] shows that K ≥ Ω(M/ε 2 ) is necessary, which is tight up to a constant factor. Our goal is to show that when hashing T blocks, the value of K required for each block increases by a factor of T . Intuitively, each block will produce some error (i.e., the hashed value is not close to uniform), and the overall error will accumulate over the blocks, so we need to inject more randomness per block to reduce the error. Indeed, we use this intuition to show that K ≥ Ω(M T /ε 2 ) is necessary for the hashed sequence to be ε-close to uniform, matching the upper bound in Theorem 3.8. Note that the lower bound holds even for a truly random hash family. Formally, we prove the following theorem. 
To prove the theorem, we need to find such an X for every hash family H. Following the intuition, we find an X that incurs certain error on a single block, and take X = (X 1 , . . . , X T ) to be T i.i.d. copies of X. More precisely, we first find a K-source X such that for Ω(1)-fraction of hash functions h ∈ H, h(X) is Ω(ε/ √ T )-far from uniform. This step is the same as the lower bound proof for extractors [RT00] , which uses the probabilistic method. We pick X to be a random flat K-source, i.e., a uniform distribution over a random set of size K, and show that X satisfies the desired property with nonzero probability. The next step is to measure how the error accumulates over independent blocks. Note that for a fixed hash function h, the hashed sequence (h(X 1 ), . . . , h(X T )) consists of T i.i.d. copies of h(X). Reyzin [Rey04] has shown that the statistical distance increases √ T when we have T independent copies for small T . However, Reyzin's result only shows an increase up to distance O(δ 1/3 ), where δ is the statistical distance of the original random variables. We improve Reyzin's result to show that the Ω( √ T ) growth continues until the distance reaches some absolute constant. We then use it to show that the joint distribution (H, Y) is far from uniform.
The following lemma corresponds to the first step. 
for some absolute constant c. Let us assume (3), and prove the lemma first. Since the claim holds for every hash function h,
Thus, there exists a flat K-source U S such that
The lemma follows by setting α = min{δ 2 /c 2 , 1/32}. We proceed to prove (3). It suffices to show that for every y ∈ [M ], with probability at least 1 − c ′ · √ α over random U S , the deviation of Pr[h(U S ) = y] from 1/M is at least 4ε/M , where c ′ is another absolute constant. That is,
Again, let us see why (4) is sufficient to prove (3) first. Let us call y ∈ [M ] is bad for S if
Since Inequality (4) holds for every y ∈ [M ], we have 
Observe that if at least 1/2-fraction of y are bad for S, then ∆(h(X),
follows by setting c = 2c ′ .
It remains to prove (4). Let
which follows by the claim below by setting L = K/M , and β = 4ε K/M (Working out the parameters, we have c ′ = 4c ′′ , ε < 1/4 implies β < √ L, and α ≤ 1/32 implies β < 1.) 
for some absolute constant c ′′ .
Intuitively, the probability in the claim is maximized when the set T has size N L/K so that L = ES[|S ∩ T |], and the claim follows by observing that in this case, the distribution has deviation Θ( √ L), and each possible outcome has probability O( 1/L). The formal proof of the claim is in Appendix A and is proved by expressing the probability in terms of binomial coefficients, and estimating them using Stirling formula.
The next step is to measure the increase of statistical distance over independent random variables.
Lemma 4.4 Let X and Y be random variables over
[M ] such that ∆(X, Y ) ≥ ε. Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X T ) be T i.i.d.
copies of X, and let
where ε 0 , c are absolute constants.
We defer the proof of the above lemma to Appendix B.
Proof of Theorem 4.1:
The absolute constant ε 0 in the theorem is a half of the ε 0 in Lemma 4.4. By Lemma 4.2 there is a flat K-source such that for 1/2-fraction of hash functions
. We set X = (X 1 , . . . , X T ) to be T independent copies of X. Consider a hash function h such that h(X) is (2ε/c √ T )-far from uniform. By Lemma 4.4, (h(X 1 ), . . . , h(X T )) is 2ε-far from uniform. Note that this holds for 1/2-fraction of hash function h. It follows that
Lower Bound for Small Collision Probability
In this subsection, we prove lower bounds on the entropy needed per item to ensure that the sequence of hashed values is close to having small collision probability. Since this requirement is less stringent than being close to uniform, less entropy is needed from the source. The interesting setting in applications is to require the hashed sequence (H, Y) = (H, H(X 1 ), . . . , H(X T )) to be ε-close to having collision probability O(1/(|H| · M T )). Recall that in this setting, instead of requiring K ≥ M T /ε 2 , K ≥ Ω(M T /ε) is sufficient for 2-universal hash functions (Theorem 3.1), and K ≥ Ω(M T + T M/ε) is sufficient for 4-wise independent hash functions (Theorem 3.5). The main improvement from 2-universal to 4-wise independent hashing is the better dependency on ε. Indeed, it can be shown that if we use truly random hash functions, we can reduce the dependency on ε to log(1/ε). Since we are now proving lower bounds for arbitrary hash families, we focus on the dependency on M and T . Specifically, our goal is to show that K = Ω(M T ) is necessary. More precisely, we show that when K ≪ M T , it is possible for the hashed sequence (H, Y) to be .99-far from any distribution that has collision probability less than 100/(|H| · M T ).
We use the same strategy as in the previous subsection to prove this lower bound. Fixing a hash family H, we take T independent copies (X 1 , . . . , X T ) of the worst-case X found in Lemma 4.2, and show that (H, H(X 1 ), . . . , H(X T )) is far from having small collision probability. The new ingredient is to show that when we have T independent copies, and K ≪ M T , then (h(X 1 ), . . . , h(X T )) is very far from uniform (say, 0.99-far) for many h ∈ H. We then argue that in this case, we can not reduce the collision probability of (h(X 1 ), . . . , h(X T )) by changing a small fraction of distribution, which implies the overall distribution (H, Y) is far from any distribution (H ′ , Z) with small collision probability. Formally, we prove the following theorem. 
Think of α and δ as constants. Then the theorem says that K = Ω(M T ) is necessary for the hashed sequence (H, H(X 1 ), . . . , H(X T )) to be close to having small collision probability, matching the upper bound in Theorem 3.1. In the previous proof, we used Lemma 4.4 to measure the increase of distance over blocks. However, the lemma can only measure the progress up to some small constant. It is known that if the number of copies T is larger then Ω(1/ε 2 ), where ε is the statistical distance of original copy, then the statistical distance goes to 1 exponentially fast. Formally, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 4.6 ([SV99]) Let X and Y be random variables over
We remark that Lemma 4.4 and 4.6 are incomparable. In the parameter range of Lemma 4.4, Lemma 4.6 only gives ∆(X, Y) ≥ Ω(T ε 2 ) instead of Ω( √ T ε). To argue that the overall distribution is far from having small collision probability, we introduce the following notion of nonuniformity.
Definition 4.7 Let X be a random variable over [M ] with probability mass function p. X is (δ, β)-nonuniform if for every function q :
, and x q(x) ≥ δ, the function satisfies
Intuitively, a distribution X over [M ] is (δ, β)-nonuniform means that even if we remove (1 − δ)-fraction of probability mass from X, the "collision probability" remains greater than β/M . In particular, X is (1 − δ)-far from any random variable Y with cp(Y ) ≤ β/M .
Lemma 4.8 Let X be a random variable over
Proof. Let p be the probability mass function of X, and q :
, and x q(x) ≥ 2 √ β · η. Our goal is to show that
This implies Pr[X
We are ready to prove Theorem 4.5.
Proof of Theorem 4.5: By Lemma 4.2 with ε = 2 ln(128α/δ 3 )/T < 1/4, there is a flat K-source X such that for (1− δ/4)-fraction of hash function h ∈ H, h(X) is ε-far from uniform, for K = Ω((δ/4) 2 M/ε 2 ) = Ω(δ 2 M T / log(α/δ)). We set X = (X 1 , . . . , X T ) to be T independent copies of X. Consider a hash function h such that h(X) is ε-far from uniform. By Lemma 4.6, (h(X 1 ), . . . , h(X T )) is (1 − η)-far from uniform, for η = e −ε 2 T /2 = δ 3 /128α. By Lemma 4.8, (h(X 1 ), . . . , h(X T )) is (δ/4, 2α/δ)-nonuniform for (1 − δ/4)-fraction of hash functions h. By the first statement of Lemma 4.9 below, this implies that (H, Y) is (1 − δ)-far from any distribution (H ′ , Z) with collision probability α/(|H| · M T ). 
Proof. We introduce the following notations first. For every h ∈ H, we define
. We also define f : H → R by
For the first statement, let (H ′ , Z) be a random variable over 
Similarly, for the second statement, let (H ′ , Z) be a random variable over
So there are at least a 1−ε/0.9-fraction of h with f (h) ≥ 0.1/|H|. At least a 2ε − ε/0.9 > ε/2-fraction of hash functions satisfy both f (h) ≥ 0.1/|H| and Y | H=h is (0.1, 2α/ε)-nonuniform. By Lemma 4.8, for each such h, we have
Lower Bounds for the Distribution of Hashed Values Only
We can extend our lower bounds to the distribution of hashed sequence Y = (H(X 1 ), . . . , H(X T )) along (without H) for both closeness requirements, at the price of losing the dependency on ε and incurring some dependency on the size of the hash family. Let 2 d = |H| be the size of the hash family. The dependency on d is necessary. Intuitively, the hashed sequence Y contains at most T · m bits of entropy, and the input (H, X 1 , . . . , X T ) contains at least d + T · k bits of entropy. When d is large enough, it is possible that all the randomness of hashed sequence comes from the randomness of the hash family. Indeed, if H is T -wise independent (which is possible with d ≃ T ·m), then (H(X 1 ), . . . , H(X T )) is uniform when X 1 , . . . , X T are all distinct. Therefore,
Thus, K = Ω(T 2 ) (independent of M ) suffices to make the hashed value close to uniform. 
Think of α and δ as constants. Then the theorem says that when the hash function contains d ≤ T /(32 ln 2) − O(1) bits of randomness, K = Ω(M T /d) is necessary for the hashed sequence to be close to uniform. For example, in some typical hash applications, N = poly(M ) and the hash function is 2-universal or O(1)-wise independent. In this case, d = O(log M ) and we need K = Ω(M T / log M ). (Recall that our upper bound in Theorem 3.1 says that K = O(M T ) suffices.) Proof. We will deduce the theorem from Theorem 4.5. Replacing the parameter α by α · 2 d in Theorem 4.5, we know that there exists an integer K = Ω(δ 2 M T /d · log(α/δ)) and a block
One limitation of the above lower bound is that it only works when d ≤ T /(32 ln 2) − O(1). For example, the lower bound cannot be applied when the hash function is T -wise independent.
Although d = Ω(T ) may not be interesting in practice, for the sake of completeness, we provide another simple lower bound to cover this parameter region. Proof. Let X be any flat K-source, i.e., a uniform distribution over a set of size K. We simply take X = (X 1 , . . . , X T ) to be T independent copies of X. Note that Y has support at most as large as (H, X). Thus,
Lower Bound for 2-universal Hash Functions
In this subsection, we show Theorem 3.1 is almost tight in the following sense. We show that there exists K = Ω(M T /ε · log(1/ε)), a 2-universal hash family H, and a block K-source X such that (H, Y) is ε-far from having collision probability 100/(|H| · M T ). The improvement over Theorem 4.5 is the almost tight dependency on ε. Recall that Theorem 3.1 says that for 2-universal hash family, K = O(M T /ε) suffices. The upper and lower bound differs by a factor of log(1/ε). In particular, our result for 4-wise independent hash functions (Theorem 3.5) cannot be achieved with 2-universal hash functions. The lower bound can further be extended to the distribution of hashed sequence Y = (H(X 1 ), . . . , H(X T )) as in the previous subsection. Furthermore, since the 2-universal hash family we use has small size, we only pay a factor of O(log M ) in the lower bound on K. Formally we prove the following results. 
Theorem 4.13 For every prime power M , real numbers ε ∈ (0, 1/4) and α ≥ 1, the following holds. For all integers t and N such that ε · M t−1 ≥ 1 and N ≥ 6εM 2t , and for T = ⌈ε 2 M 2t−1 log(αM/ε)⌉, there exists an integer K = Ω(M T /ε · log(αM/ε)), and a 2-universal hash family
Basically, the idea is to show that the Markov Inequality applied in the proof of Theorem 3.1 (see Inequality (1))is tight for a single block. More precisely, we show that there exists a 2-universal hash family H, and a K-source X such that with probability ε over h ← H, cp(h(X)) ≥ 1/M + Ω(1/Kε). Intuitively, if we take T = Θ(Kε · log(α/ε)/M ) independent copies of such X, then the collision probability will satisfy cp(h(X 1 ),
, and so the overall collision probability is cp(H, Y) ≥ α/(|H| · M T ). Formally, we analyze our construction below using Hellinger distance, and show that the collision probability remains high even after modifying a Θ(ε)-fraction of distribution.
Proof of Theorem 4.12: Fix a prime power M , and ε > 0, we identify [M ] with the finite field F of size M . Let t be an integer parameter such that M t−1 > 1/ε. Recall that the set H 0 of linear functions {h a : F t → F} a∈F t where h a ( x) = i a i x i is 2-universal. Note that picking a random hash function h ← H 0 is equivalent to picking a random vector a ← F t . Two special properties of H 0 are (i) when a = 0, the whole domain F t is sent to 0 ∈ F, and (ii) the size of hash family |H 0 | is the same as the size of the domain, namely |F t |. We will use H 0 as a building block in our construction.
We proceed to construct the hash family H. We partition the domain [N ] into several subdomains, and apply different hash function to each sub-domain. Let s be an integer parameter to be determined later. We require In our construction, the data X will never come from D 0 . Thus, wlog, we can assume D 0 is empty. For every i = 1, . . . , s, we use a linear hash function h a i ∈ H 0 to send D i to F. Thus, a hash function h ∈ H consists of s linear hash function (h a 1 , . . . , h as ), and can be described by s vectors a 1 , . . . , a s ∈ F t . Note that to make H 2-universal, it suffices to pick a 1 , . . . , a s pairwise independently. Specifically, we identify F t with the finite fieldF of size M t , and pick ( a 1 , . . . It is easy to verify that H is indeed 2-universal, and |H| = M 2t .
We next define a single block K-source X that makes the Markov Inequality (1) tight. We simply take X to be a uniform distribution over D 
Note that h a,b is bad with probability 
We set s = ⌈4εM t ⌉ ≤ M t . It follows that with probability at least 2ε over h ← H, the collision probability satisfies cp(h(X)) ≥ 1/M + 1/(4Kε), as we intuitively desired. However, instead of working with collision probability directly, we need to use Hellinger closeness to measure the growth of distance to uniform (see Definition 3. 9 .) The following claim upper bounds the Hellinger closeness of h(X) for bad hash functions h. The proof of the claim is deferred to the end of this section.
Claim 4.14 Suppose h is a bad hash function defined as above, then the Hellinger closeness of h(X) satisfies C(h(X)) ≤ 1 − M/(64Kε).
Finally, for every integer T ∈ [ε 2 M 2t−1 log(α/ε), c 0 · ε 2 M 2t−1 log(α/ε)], we can write T = c · (64Kε/M ) · ln(800α/ε) for some constant c < c 0 . Let X = (X 1 , . . . , X T ) be T independent copies of X. We now show that K, H, X satisfy the conclusion of the theorem. That is, K = Ω(M T /(ε log(α/ε))) (as follows from the definition of T ) and (H, Y) = (H, H(X 1 ), . . . , H(X T )) is ε-far from any distribution (H ′ , Z) with cp(H ′ , Z) ≤ α/(|H| · M T ).
Consider the distribution (h(X 1 ), . . . , h(X T )) for a bad hash function h ∈ H. From the above claim, the Hellinger closeness satisfies C(h(X 1 ), . . . , h(X T )) = C(h(X))
T ≤ (1 − M/64Kε) T ≤ e M T /64Kε ≤ 800α ε .
By Lemma 3.10 and the definition of Hellinger closeness, we have ∆((h(X 1 ), . . . , h(X T )), U [M ] T ) ≥ 1 − C(h(X 1 ), . . . , h(X T )) ≥ 1 − 800α ε . Proof. By an abuse of notation, we use T to denote the size of set T . The probability can be expressed as a sum of binomial coefficients as follows.
A Technical Lemma on Binomial Coefficients
Note that there are at most ⌊2β √ L⌋ + 1 terms, it suffices to show that for every
We use the following bound on binomial coefficients, which can be derived from Stirling's formula. Note that L ∈ [0, K/2] implies K − R = Ω(K). When 2R ≤ T ≤ N − 2K + 2R, we have
as desired. Note that when N > 2K, such T exists. Finally, observe that β 2 < L implies R ≥ 1, and f (T ) f (T + 1) = (T − R + 1)(N − T ) (T + 1)(N − T − K + R) . Proof. We prove the lemma by the following two claims. The first claim reduces the lemma to the special case that X is a Bernoulli random variable with bias Ω(ε), and Y is a uniform coin. The second claim proves the special case.
It follows that f (T ) is increasing when

